2025/01/07 by João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel, Dawisson Belém Lopes · 1 voice
Materials Science · Social Sciences · #Graphite, nuclear technology, radiation studies #International Science and Diplomacy #Risk Perception and Management
paper · doi:10.1093/scipol/scaf002
openalex publication_date 2025/01/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/01
Abstract The article examines Brazil’s attempt to establish a national nuclear industry during its military regime (1964–85), focusing on the 1975 nuclear agreement with West Germany. Based on extensive document analysis and interviews, this study reveals that despite the agreement’s goal of reducing dependence on US technology, it reinforced Brazil’s reliance on foreign sources and highlighted flaws in its Science and Technology strategy. The technocratic elite, or “nucleocracy,” prioritized rapid development over nurturing domestic research, sidelining academic and industrial stakeholders. The article employs the National Innovation Systems framework, particularly the triple helix model, to demonstrate how insufficient collaboration between academia, industry, and government hindered the establishment of a self-sufficient nuclear sector. The findings underscore that international scientific collaborations, while intended to foster technological autonomy, can paradoxically entrench dependence when domestic capacity-building is neglected.