2026/04/04 by Jasper Friedrich · 2 voices
Arts and Humanities · #Philosophy, Science, and History #Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education #Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
paper · doi:10.16995/pp.27637
openalex publication_date 2026/04/04 · openalex created_date 2026/04/05 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/28
This paper revisits the debate on ideal and nonideal theory by taking seriously Charles Mills’s suggestion that it should be understood as a dispute between idealism and materialism. I argue that by understanding different sides of the debates as relying on idealist or materialist assumptions, respectively, we can better make sense of disagreements where theorists otherwise seem to be talking past each other. In addition, I claim that the materialist objection to ideal theory is best understood as a fetishism critique in the Marxian sense: ideal theory treats products of human problem-solving as if they had independent authority over us. To justify ideal theory, one needs to accord either normative or practical authority to ideal-as-idealized-models, and materialism denies both. Finally, I show that rejecting ideal theory does not entail reformism but is compatible with radical critique.