2008/07/21 by James Wilson · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Eastern European Communism and Reforms #Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics #International Relations and Foreign Policy
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1741-5705.2008.02655.x
openalex publication_date 2008/07/21 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
This article examines how Soviet leaders responded to Ronald Reagan during his first presidential administration. It contests the notion that Reagan's tough rhetoric and arms buildup from 1981 to 1984 made Gorbachev possible. It draws on fresh evidence to argue that Reagan's words and deeds had precisely the opposite effect—they emboldened hard‐liners within the Kremlin and ultimately postponed “new thinking.”