2026/05/05 by Frank N. von Hippel, Eli Sanchez · 1 voice
Medicine · Social Sciences · #Biotechnology and Related Fields #Nuclear Issues and Defense #Science, Research, and Medicine
paper · doi:10.1080/10736700.2026.2640680
openalex publication_date 2026/05/05 · openalex created_date 2026/05/06 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/18
In 1974, India tested a “peaceful nuclear explosive” using plutonium that had been separated from irraditated research-reactor fuel in a “reprocessing” plant designed with the help of a US company. The United States provided the assistance in the belief that India would use the plutonium to fuel a prototype breeder reactor as part of India’s nuclear-power program. India’s diversion of the plutonium to a nuclear-weapons program caused the United States to adopt a policy of not using weapons-usable materials in research- or power-reactor fuel and not facilitating the production or use of such materials by other countries. Since 1995, there has been a debate in the United States as to whether that effort should be extended to the US nuclear navy, which fuels its propulsion reactors with weapons-grade uranium. In 2021, the debate became more urgent after the United States and the United Kingdom committed to helping Australia, a non-nuclear-weapon state, build nuclear-powered attack submarines fueled with US weapons-grade uranium. The US Navy initially rejected the idea of designing its naval reactors to be fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is not attractive as a nuclear weapons material. During a brief two-year period in 2014–16, however, it was open to launching a program to develop high-density LEU fuel, as has been done to maintain fuel life in research reactors that have been converted from highly enriched uranium to LEU fuel, but, during the first Trump administration, the Navy turned against that idea again. This article reviews the political and technical debate and suggests a path forward.