2024/11/06 by Manuel Alvariño, Milan Thies · 2 voices · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Labor Movements and Unions #Political and Economic history of UK and US #Social Policy and Reform Studies
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/gov.2024.25
openalex publication_date 2024/11/06 · openalex created_date 2024/11/07 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/23
Abstract Many studies have analysed what could motivate centre-right governments to develop progressive family policies, given their historically traditionalist ideology. Updating classic institutionalist accounts, this article expands the focus beyond centre-right parties formally in charge. It argues that in coalition and minority governments, partisan veto players may act as agenda-setters, design policy reforms and successfully exert pressure to approve them through three mechanisms: agreements for government formation, conditions for government survival and bureaucratic continuity. Drawing on novel empirical data from interviews and document analysis, this article applies deductive process tracing to analyse the German parental allowance reform of 2006 and the Spanish 2017 paternity leave extension. The findings complement existing studies that focus on the agency of centre-right parties as ‘protagonists’ of these reforms, arguing that in some cases they have instead ‘consented’ to reforms proposed and supported by other parties.