2019/06/10 by Junhwan Lee, Lee, Junhwan, Ahmad F. Taha +5
Computer Science · Engineering · Medicine · #Anomaly Detection Techniques and Applications #FOS: Electrical engineering #FOS: Mathematics #Interstitial Lung Diseases and Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1906.03928
openalex publication_date 2019/06/10 · openalex created_date 2022/07/22 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The operation of critical infrastructures such as the electrical power grid,\ncellphone towers, and financial institutions relies on precise timing provided\nby stationary GPS receivers. These GPS devices are vulnerable to a type of\nspoofing called Time Synchronization Attack (TSA), whose objective is to\nmaliciously alter the timing provided by the GPS receiver. The objective of\nthis paper is to design a tuning-free, low memory robust estimator to mitigate\nsuch spoofing attacks. The contribution is that the proposed method dispenses\nwith several limitations found in the existing state-of-the-art methods in the\nliterature that require parameter tuning, availability of the statistical\ndistributions of noise, real-time optimization, or heavy computations.\nSpecifically, we (i) utilize an observer design for linear systems under\nunknown inputs, (ii) adjust it to include a state-correction algorithm, (iii)\ndesign a realistic experimental setup with real GPS data and sensible spoofing\nattacks, and (iv) showcase how the proposed tuning-free, low memory robust\nestimator can combat TSAs. Numerical tests with real GPS data demonstrate that\naccurate time can be provided to the user under various attack conditions.\n