2025/06/09 by Ian O’Flynn, David Russell · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #European Union Policy and Governance #Political Conflict and Governance #Political Philosophy and Ethics
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/s1537592725000647
openalex publication_date 2025/06/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11
Veto rights are a prominent institutional feature in ethnically divided societies, especially power-sharing democracies. Yet while vetoes are intended to protect the vital interests of each ethnic community, they can give rise to serious concerns about political deadlock and instability. In response, we argue that vetoes should be subject to a justificatory test grounded in public reason. On the face of it, one troubling consequence of this approach is that a community’s assessment of its own vital interests cannot be decisive. Yet as we explain, the critical issue is not who should be the arbiter of an interest but the need to be fair to the interests of all concerned. To illustrate how a public reason approach of this sort might be rendered sufficiently specific to be of practical use, we take human rights law as our example. Having considered a number of potential difficulties that this example throws up, we conclude by noting how a justificatory test can help to deliver not just greater political stability but a more democratically progressive form of politics.