2014/08/08 by Adrian Kent · 1 voice · 3 citations
Arts and Humanities · Physics and Astronomy · Psychology · #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #gr-qc #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1007/s10701-014-9862-5
published as Foundations of Physics 45, 2 (2015), pp 211-217 · Minor expansion of conclusions at request of referee. To appear in Foundations of Physics
arxiv published 2014/08/08 · arxiv created 2014/12/01 · openalex publication_date 2014/12/19 · arxiv updated 2015/01/21 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Following a proposal of Vaidman, Sebens and Carroll have argued that in Everettian (i.e. purely unitary) quantum theory, observers are uncertain, before they complete their observation, about which Everettian branch they are on. They argue further that this solves the problem of making sense of probabilities within Everettian quantum theory, even though the theory itself is deterministic. We note some problems with these arguments.