2026/04/15 by Ben Baker, Richard D. Lange, Andrew Richmond +4 · 1 voice
Computer Science · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Embodied and Extended Cognition #Face Recognition and Perception #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #cs.OH
paper · pdf · doi:10.51628/001c.160037
arxiv published 2026/04/15 · arxiv updated 2026/04/15 · openalex publication_date 2026/04/17 · openalex created_date 2026/04/18 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
Representations play a central role in the study of both biological and artificial intelligence, as well as philosophy of mind. Across neuroscience, computer science, and philosophy, a recurring theme is that representations not only carry information but should be ``useful'' for or ``usable'' by an agent in some sense. Here, we review how the ``usefulness'' of representations has been conceptualized and how it figures into different conceptions of representation. We identify and explore four aspects of use and usability: representations generally carry information; that information may or may not be useful and it may or may not be encoded in a usable format; and the representations may or may not be used downstream. Building on these four aspects of information and use, we then organize existing perspectives on neural representations into three levels: Representations as Information (Level 1); Representations as Usable (Level 2); and Representations as Used (Level 3). Our account is meant to give readers an appreciation for the diversity of notions of ``neural representation,'' help them navigate the vast and multi-disciplinary literature on the topic, and help them clarify the appropriate notion of representation for their own investigations.