2025/01/26 by Francesco Marchi · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/09515089.2025.2452392
openalex publication_date 2025/01/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
Self-deception is a common phenomenon. Most traditional accounts of self-deception agree that self-deception is doxastic as it involves the acquisition of a false belief. Thus, it seems that any adequate doxastic theory of self-deception should be accompanied by a theory of belief acquisition. In this article, I argue that the mainstream doxastic view in the self-deception literature, namely motivationalism, presupposes a Cartesian theory of belief acquisition. I present and discuss the alternative Spinozan theory of belief acquisition and argue that self-deceptive beliefs are likely to be acquired in a Spinozan way. If this is correct, the causal route to self-deception proposed by motivationalists, which runs from evidence to belief, needs to be inverted. I offer a novel take on motivationalism based on Spinozan belief acquisition, which I call Spinozan self-deception. I discuss theoretical advantages of the novel view over motivationalism as well as some of the phenomena it may help explain.