2026/06/25 by Daniel Statman · 1 voice
Neuroscience · Psychology · #Emotions and Moral Behavior #Free Will and Agency #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
paper · doi:10.1086/741038
openalex publication_date 2026/06/25 · openalex created_date 2026/06/26 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In liberal societies, revenge is usually regarded as inherently wrong. I challenge this view by examining two grounds for its impermissibility: motivation and consequences. Because acts of revenge are defined by motivation, the most plausible objection is that this motivation is morally flawed. I reject various arguments supporting this claim and similarly dismiss the objection that revenge is impermissible due to its consequences. I conclude that whether revenge is permissible is a contingent matter and that recognizing a vengeful motive within us is a reason for caution, not for refraining from action.