2024/07/01 by Jen Semler · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Free Will and Agency #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
paper · pdf · doi:10.1017/can.2025.10008
openalex publication_date 2024/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Abstract Many views of moral agency include, implicitly or explicitly, a consciousness requirement —namely, the claim that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition of moral agency. This paper casts doubt on the consciousness requirement. I argue that consciousness is not necessary for instantiating four key capacities necessary for moral agency: action, moral concept possession, responsiveness to moral reasons, and moral understanding. I defend my picture of nonconscious moral agency as a plausible account of an entity that can act for moral reasons and can be morally responsible. Lastly, I discuss broader implications of my argument, especially on the possibility of artificial moral agency.