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Voting <i>for</i> Violence: Security Vacuums and Armed Party Support

2025/07/24 by Mary Beth Altier · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Political Conflict and Governance #Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East #Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

paper · doi:10.1093/jogss/ogaf025

openalex publication_date 2025/07/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30

Abstract

Abstract How do armed groups win support in democratic elections? Previous research examines whether armed groups choose to participate in elections and the effects of their violence on the performance of conventional political parties. Few studies, however, focus on how these groups and their associated armed parties win over voters especially in relatively strong democracies. Using data for 101 electoral districts during Northern Ireland’s Troubles and archival and interview research, this study demonstrates that an important driver of armed party support is violence, which triggers or exacerbates a security vacuum. A security vacuum occurs where civilians believe the state is unable or unwilling to protect them from undue physical harm. Security vacuums represent a severing of the social contract. They also alter civilians’ relationships with state institutions and create the need for alternative nodes of authority and governance, despite ongoing territorial control and service provision by the state. Armed parties may then benefit, even in developed democracies, from key governance activities such as informal policing or facilitating safe access to services.

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