2025/09/11 by Allard Duursma, Janek Bruker, Valentin Felix Geier · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Conflict Management and Negotiation #Peacebuilding and International Security #Political Conflict and Governance
paper · doi:10.1093/isq/sqaf091
openalex publication_date 2025/09/11 · openalex created_date 2025/12/03 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Abstract This article argues that third-party mediators who simultaneously provide external military support to a conflict party possess unique leverage to pressure both sides into peace negotiations and agreements. By threatening to increase, reduce, or withdraw such support, coercive mediators can compel parties to enter talks and sign settlements. However, these agreements are often fragile. The article identifies two mechanisms behind this fragility: (1) settlements are often artificial and reliant on sustained third-party involvement, and (2) parties may sign agreements to avoid losing support but resist implementing difficult provisions later when implementation becomes politically or militarily costly. The article tests this theory using Peace Observatory data on 6,277 negotiation rounds in armed conflicts from 1989 to 2023. The findings show that coercive mediation significantly increases the likelihood of both the initiation of formal negotiations and the conclusion of peace agreements. However, agreements reached through coercive mediation are substantially less durable. Two case studies on Angola (1989–1991) further illustrate how coercive leverage enabled short-term breakthroughs but contributed to the rapid breakdown of imposed settlements. Coercive mediation is thus a double-edged sword: effective in the short term, destabilizing in the long run.