Two-player nonZero-sum stopping games in discrete time

2004/10/06 by Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan
Mathematics · #math.PR #msc:60G40 #msc:91A15 #msc:91A05.

paper · pdf · doi:10.1214/009117904000000162

published as Annals of Probability 2004, Vol. 32, No. 3B, 2733-2764 · Published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org) in the Annals of Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aop/) at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/009117904000000162

arxiv created 2004/10/06 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01

Abstract

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an ε-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every ε>0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of ε-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.

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