Two-player nonZero–sum stopping games in discrete time

2004/07/01 by Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Economic theories and models #Game Theory and Applications #Stochastic processes and financial applications #math.PR #msc:60G40 #msc:91A05. #msc:91A15

paper · pdf · doi:10.1214/009117904000000162

published as Annals of Probability 2004, Vol. 32, No. 3B, 2733-2764 · Published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org) in the Annals of Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aop/) at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/009117904000000162

openalex publication_date 2004/07/01 · arxiv created 2004/10/06 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We prove that every two-player nonzero–sum stopping game in discrete time admits an ɛ-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every ɛ>0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey’s theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of ɛ-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.

Citations

• On a Problem of Formal Logic
• Stopping games in continuous time

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