A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems

2003/10/17 by Chiranjeeb Buragohain, Divyakant Agrawal, Subhash Suri
Computer Science · #cs.GT

paper · pdf

published as Proc. of the Third International Conference on P2P Computing (P2P2003), Linkoping Sweden, 2003

arxiv created 2003/10/17 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01

Abstract

Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.

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