Jumping the queue: Nepotism and public-sector pay

2020/07/30 by Andri Chassamboulli, Pedro Gomes · 1 voice · 3 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Economic Policies and Impacts #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth #Labor market dynamics and wage inequality

paper · doi:10.1016/j.red.2020.07.006

openalex publication_date 2020/07/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

We set up a model with search and matching frictions to understand the effects of employment and wage policies, as well as nepotism in hiring in the public sector, on unemployment and rent seeking. Conditional on inefficiently high public-sector wages, more nepotism in public-sector hiring lowers the unemployment rate because it limits the size of queues for public-sector jobs. Wage and employment policies impose an endogenous constraint on the number of workers the government can hire through connections.

Citations

• HETEROGENEITY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE POLICY

Cited by

• Public-sector employment, wages and education decisions
• Public employment redux
• Public employment and homeownership dynamics

Discussions

• 𝐉𝐮𝐦𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐮𝐞 Public-sector hiring: where connections beat CVs 🤝📄. Turns out, nepotism can lower unemployment by shortening queues for cushy jobs—but meritocracy is definitely si [bsky, 6 points, 0 comments]

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• Public employment redux
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