1987/07/01 by Charles A. Moore
Environmental Science · Social Sciences · #Crime Patterns and Interventions #Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance #Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses
paper · doi:10.1177/0011128787033003004
openalex publication_date 1987/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Conventional wisdom accords deterrence a prominent role in the control of corporate crime. It is argued that current confidence in a deterrence strategy is unfounded, first, because it is based on an unrealistic view of corporate decision making and, second, because it makes an overly optimistic appraisal of our legal system's capacity to control corporate conduct through punitive means. It is further argued that efforts to increase the sanctions imposed on corporate offenders may produce unintended consequences that would increase, rather than lessen, the victimization resulting from corporate wrongdoing. “Penetrating” legal controls, such as incapacitation and rehabilitation, are proposed as preferable alternatives.