2025/07/14 by Barak Mendelsohn
Social Sciences · #Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies #Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts #Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
paper · doi:10.1080/1057610x.2025.2528342
openalex publication_date 2025/07/14 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Following Hamas’s October 7 (2023) terrorist attack on Israel, some Israeli officials accused Qatar of sponsoring Hamas’s terrorism. On the face of it, these speakers were correct: Qatar fits the label of a state who sponsors terrorism. Not only was Qatar hosting Hamas’s “external” leadership, it also paid salaries of Hamas civil servants in Gaza and for the Strip’s electricity needs, essential for keeping Hamas’s rule in Gaza. And yet Qatar managed to escape accountability for the October 7 massacre, and may even strengthened its international position by using its mediation services. Qatar’s relationship with Hamas presents an interesting case of state-sponsored terrorism, producing important insights concerning the reasons states engage in sponsorship, the costs of sponsorship, and the politics of accountability. Following a discussion of the shortcomings of the literature on states that sponsor terrorism – its focus on hierarchical relations, lack of clarity about what constitutes support, neglect of terrorist groups’ other roles and identity markers, and insufficient attention to the way states could mitigate costs – the article examines these aspects of Qatar’s relationship with Hamas. Strategic considerations were central for Qatar’s foreign policy, but Doha’s relations with Hamas had little to do with hostility to Israel. Qatar supported Hamas for strategic and ideational reasons, mostly related to inter-Arab politics, despite Hamas’s terrorism. The article also elaborates on the diverse ways Qatar sought to reduce potential costs from its relationship with Hamas.