2026/07/27 by Tito Boeri, Tommaso Crescioli, Andrea Garnero +1
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Labor Movements and Unions #Labor market dynamics and wage inequality #Merger and Competition Analysis
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/irel.70036
openalex publication_date 2026/07/27 · openalex created_date 2026/07/28 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
ABSTRACT Can collective bargaining mitigate monopsony power? This paper studies the extent to which collective agreements regulating employee noncompete clauses affect firm‐level markdowns in French manufacturing. Using a staggered difference‐in‐differences design, we find that such regulation reduces markdowns by 1.3%–2.2% on average. The effects increase over time and are stronger among smaller, less productive, low‐wage firms. Leveraging a French Court of Cassation ruling requiring financial compensation for enforceable noncompetes, we show complementarity between national regulations and sectoral bargaining. By strengthening compliance and adding limitations, collective bargaining emerges as an effective regulatory tool shaping firms' use of noncompete agreements.