2025/01/02 by Alexander Sorg · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Eastern European Communism and Reforms #European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies #Nuclear Issues and Defense
paper · doi:10.1080/10736700.2025.2523702
openalex publication_date 2025/01/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/15
In 2022, Russia announced its plans to deploy nuclear weapons to Belarus, which would mark the first such deployment in an allied state since the Soviet Union’s collapse. Deploying nuclear weapons carries significant risks, including information theft, unauthorized use, and unintended escalation. Given these dangers, it is essential to examine why Russia would consider stationing its nuclear forces in Belarus. Existing scholarship identifies three primary motivations for such deployments: assurance, extended deterrence, and power projection. This article evaluates these theoretical explanations in the context of the potentially first new foreign nuclear-weapons deployment by any state since 1974. Importantly, the three strategies are not mutually exclusive. However, the assumption that President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, facing heightened domestic opposition bolstered by Western support, might have sought to secure his alliance with Russia (assurance) appears the least plausible. Evidence suggests that, from Russia's perspective, a primary objective may be to deter Western states from interfering in Belarus (extended deterrence). Additionally, there is support for the view that the deployments serve Russia’s direct interests by enabling it to intimidate NATO members, distribute responsibility for potential use with Belarus, and utilize the deployments in future arms-control negotiations (power projection).