2025/09/02 by Richard Bowes · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Canadian Identity and History #Irish and British Studies #Military History and Strategy
paper · doi:10.1080/19475020.2025.2604811
openalex publication_date 2025/09/02 · openalex created_date 2025/12/31 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/15
This paper applies a levels of analysis approach to analyse and de-conflate the inconsistency in the historical and historiographical legacy of the Battle of Passchendaele between two levels: the operational level of war as conducted by Field Marshal Douglas Haig, General Officer Commanding (GOC) British Expeditionary Force (BEF); and at the tactical level of war as conducted by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie in command of the Canadian Corps. By applying the levels of analysis approach to delineate the strategic and operational from the tactical levels of war the paper confirms and accepts the common view that Passchendaele was a failure at the operational level of war. Haig’s operational concept of a deep advance and general breakthrough was not achieved. Fighting at the operational level of war, the BEF’s military strategic objectives were not achieved. Consequently, the historical and historiographical legacy of the campaign has been one of futility, waste, and callous indifference, which, unfortunately, has also conflated the historical and historiographical appraisals of the achievements of those formations and units of the BEF (such as the Canadian Corps) that had achieved success fighting at the tactical level of war. Through a particular focus on the performance of the Canadian Corps, this article has de-conflated this inconsistency. Henceforward, the Canadian Corps’ victory at Passchendaele deserves to be recognised as a significant tactical victory in line with the accomplishments of the Corps in previous and subsequent tactical victories such as Vimy Ridge and Hill 70 in 1917 and The Hundred Days in 1918.