1999/07/01 by Margaret Gilbert
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · #Free Will and Agency #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #War, Ethics, and Justification
paper · doi:10.1017/s0953820800002399
openalex publication_date 1999/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/26
We speak of ‘obligations’ in many contexts. But what are obligations? I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call ‘joint commitments’. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligations in his sense are contexts in which there are obligations of joint commitment. Nonetheless different senses of ‘obligation’ appear to be at issue.