2013/05/31 by Marc Slors · 1 citation
Neuroscience · #Free Will and Agency #Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
paper · doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.803922
openalex publication_date 2013/05/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this process? I argue that answers to these questions point to a picture of distal conscious intending as a form of self-programming. The metaphor of “self-programming” will be elucidated by using a distinction between “structuring” and “triggering” causes. Though the self-programming metaphor does not amount to a full theory of conscious intending, I argue that it may be a useful heuristic in developing such a theory. I also argue that the metaphor is phenomenologically plausible.