2024/02/09 by Elliot Lipnowski, Lipnowski, Elliot, Ravid Doron +3
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference #FOS: Economics and business #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2402.06765
openalex publication_date 2024/02/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so coincides with her "Bayesian persuasion" value. A sufficient condition in finite models is that every action which is receiver-optimal at some belief is uniquely optimal at some other belief -- a generic property. We similarly show the equilibrium sender payoff is typically unique in ordered models. In an extension, we show uniqueness generates robustness to imperfect sender commitment.