2011/06/30 by Hal Brands · 1 voice · 4 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Economic Sanctions and International Relations #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts
paper · doi:10.1080/14682745.2011.564612
openalex publication_date 2011/06/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Since the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, numerous observers and scholars have alleged that the United States ‘green-lighted’ Saddam Hussein's decision to go to war. This article scrutinises the green light thesis by examining US and Iraqi documents that have recently become available to scholars. These records reveal that the green light thesis has more basis in myth than in reality. Preoccupied with issues such as the Iran hostage crisis and the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter administration officials neither expected nor welcomed Saddam's attack on Iran. The Iraqi dictator, for his part, believed that Washington would oppose rather than support his war.