2012/10/01 by Bob Plant · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2012.01770.x
openalex publication_date 2012/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Abstract Widespread and lasting consensus has not been philosophy's fate. Indeed, one of philosophy's most striking features is its ability to accommodate “not only different answers to philosophical questions” but also “total disagreement on what questions are philosophical ” ( R orty , 58). It is therefore hardly surprising that philosophers' responses to this metaphilosophical predicament have been similarly varied. This article considers two recent diagnoses of philosophical diversity: K ornblith and R escher (respectively) claim that taking philosophical disagreement seriously does not lead to metaphilosophical scepticism. The article argues that their confidence is misplaced in so far as both wrongly assume that ordinary, first‐order philosophical practice and second‐order metaphilosophical reflection are separate enterprises.