2026/01/01 by Friedrich L. Sell, Jürgen Stiefl
Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Political Systems and Governance #Populism, Right-Wing Movements
paper · doi:10.5771/0340-1758-2026-2-340
openalex publication_date 2026/01/01 · openalex created_date 2026/07/29 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Can strategically motivated redistricting help large U.S. states counteract the historically recurring seat losses of the president’s party in the midterm elections? Using Texas and California – together accounting for over 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives – as case studies, first the institutional logic and mechanisms of Gerrymandering are outlined, notably “packing and cracking,” and its political as well as economic consequences discussed. While Texas has repeatedly engaged in partisan Gerrymandering since 2010, California largely avoided such practices due to its independent redistricting commission – until political initiatives in 2025 signaled a possible return to partisan map drawing. An empirical review of district level seat changes from 2010 to 2024 shows that shifts in Texas often aligned with partisan incentives, whereas California exhibited greater stability. The article concludes that Gerrymandering may influence the 2026 elections at the margin although structural factors such as demographic trends, legal constraints, and rising political participation substantially limit its potential impact. [ZParl, vol. 57 (2026), no. 2, pp. 340 – 355]