2014/01/08 by Francesca Polletta, Zaibu Tufail · 2 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Economic Theory and Institutions #Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism #Political Economy and Marxism
paper · doi:10.1111/socf.12067
openalex publication_date 2014/01/08 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
If given the opportunity to reduce your debt, albeit at some financial risk, would you take it? Interviews and observations in two debt settlement firms show that debt settlement clients tend not to calculate financial risks in deciding which debts to try to settle. Rather, they treat their relationship with their creditor as a reciprocal and ongoing one. If the service provided by their creditor was inadequate, clients feel justified in trying to settle their debt. Otherwise, they believe that they must pay back the debt in full. In line with recent work in economic sociology, we show that economic transactors are bound by the moral requirements of the relationship they are in. But debt settlement clients invent those relationships in at least two ways: turning a debt to an impersonal agency into a relationship with a person, and turning a relationship of inequality into one of equality. Clients may preserve some sense of autonomy in a disempowering relationship by conceptualizing their relationship with their creditor as one between equals. But there is a cost: As a result of the relational schemas on which they operate, they often refuse to try to settle debts that might be settled without lasting financial repercussions.