2021/11/24 by Jeanine Miklós‐Thal, Greg Shaffer
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #Digital Platforms and Economics #Merger and Competition Analysis
paper · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12389
openalex publication_date 2021/11/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Abstract This article analyzes supply tariffs that discriminate between resale in different markets. In a setting with competing retailers that operate in multiple (independent or interdependent) markets, we show that, all else equal, a monopolist supplier wants to discriminate against resale in the market with the higher aggregate cross‐seller diversion ratio. We find that discrimination can improve allocative efficiency and present sufficient conditions, involving the pass‐through rates and the market demand curvatures in the different markets, under which discrimination has positive effects on output and welfare. Our insights are relevant for the policy treatment of vertical restraints on online sales.