2012/08/01 by Christopher Goscha, Christopher E. Goscha · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Chinese history and philosophy #Historical Studies and Socio-cultural Analysis #Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
paper · doi:10.1179/0729247312z.0000000007
openalex publication_date 2012/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
By choosing to transition to modern, set-piece battle during the second half of the Indochina War, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) created one of the most socially totalizing wars in order to meet that ambitious goal. This article argues that, while the DRV did indeed create a remarkably modern army of six divisions, the lack of a mechanized logistical system meant that it had to mobilize hundreds of thousands of civilian porters to supply its troops moving across Indochina. To do this, the communist party undertook a massive mobilization drive and simultaneously expanded its efforts to take the state in hand. The DRV made war, but war also directly shaped the nature of this state. This article also shows why this transition to modern war rapidly collapsed the line between civilians and combatants in ways more ‘totalizing’ than many have previously thought.