2025/11/26 by Christian J. Baehr, Hanno Hilbig, António Valentim · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Media Influence and Politics
paper · doi:10.31235/osf.io/2g4x7_v2
openalex publication_date 2025/11/26 · openalex created_date 2025/11/27 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/14
As climate impacts intensify, governments increasingly adopt adaptation policies, yet their electoral consequences remain poorly understood. We study electoral effects of moratoria on homeowners insurance nonrenewals after California wildfires. Using a difference-in-differences design exploiting eligibility rules, we find null effects on support for incumbents. To explain, we develop a framework of experience-based accountability, arguing that the electoral effect of adaptation is path-dependent: prior crisis experience sets the standard for what voters perceive as a sufficient policy. Consistent with this, we find modest electoral rewards where prior insurance disruption was limited, but none where it was chronic. Survey evidence indicates that, prior to the policy, residents of high-disruption areas already held more negative and crystallized views of the governor. We offer a framework for the politics of adaptation, showing that credit depends on perceived sufficiency: a standard set not only by the policy, but also by voters’ prior experience with the crisis.