2025/12/02 by Nicolás Sebastián Sánchez · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Embodied and Extended Cognition #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy and Theoretical Science
paper · doi:10.1080/09515089.2025.2596272
openalex created_date 2025/12/02 · openalex publication_date 2025/12/02 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/14
One of Daniel Dennett’s best known and widely discussed views concerns his reflections on the epistemic value of applying psychological vocabulary to account for human and nonhuman behavior. In this paper, I argue that Dennett’s views on the intentional stance shift in his later work, where he treats it as a “subspecies of the design stance.” I will argue that this interpretation eschews the role of the rationality assumption in determining what the system represents, and enables Dennett to answer a traditional objection raised against the intentional stance outlook: arbitrariness – objection: the claim that his view entails that intentional concepts have arbitrary application conditions.