2018/10/15 by Robert Streiffer, David Killoren · 4 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Neuroscience · Psychology · Veterinary · #Animal testing and alternatives #Epistemology #Human-Animal Interaction Studies #Neglect #Philosophy #Psychology #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1534194
published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49(1), 1-21 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2018/10/15 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Abstract We distinguish two conceptions of confinement – the agential conception and the comparative conception – and show that the former is intimately related to use in a way that the latter is not. Specifically, in certain conditions, agential confinement constitutes use and creates a special relationship that makes neglect or abuse especially egregious. This allows us to develop and defend an account of one important way in which agential confinement can be morally wrong. We then discuss some of the account’s practical implications, including its usefulness for decision-making in real-world contexts in which animals are confined.