Medical malpractice liability and physicians’ behavior: Experimental evidence

2019/08/16 by Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, Paolo Lorenzo Ferrara, Calogero Guccio +1
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Health Professions · #Healthcare Policy and Management #Healthcare cost, quality, practices #Medical Malpractice and Liability Issues

paper · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.006

openalex publication_date 2019/08/16 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/26

Citations

• Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement
• Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian family physicians
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