Property rights in a weak state: Evidence from land pawning in Qing Taiwan (1683–1895)

2024/05/01 by Shao‐yu Jheng, Hui‐Wen Koo, Kun‐jung Wu · 1 voice
Agricultural and Biological Sciences · Social Sciences · #Land Rights and Reforms #Urban and Rural Development Challenges #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies

paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/aehr.12288

Abstract

Abstract Land pawning is considered inefficient because it causes property rights to be unclearly delineated. Despite this, it once prevailed worldwide. We propose that this system flourished when state capacity was weak and the private sector spontaneously managed public affairs. Local collaboration made it difficult to sell land outright to an outsider who might be an unreliable collaborator. Land pawning granted the pawner's family and neighbours a ‘probation’ period to observe the pawnee's behaviour. If they found the pawnee irresponsible, they could still redeem the land. Data compiled from contracts in Qing Taiwan support our hypothesis.

Discussions

• Property rights matter! In Qing Taiwan the pawning rather than sale of land improved economic efficiency in the presence of weak state capacity by easing land transfer to strangers, according to Shao- [bsky, 14 points, 0 comments]

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