On two solution concepts in a class of multicriteria games

2014/05/13 by Justo Puerto, Puerto, Justo, Federico Perea +1
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #cs.GT #math.OC

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1405.3176

openalex publication_date 2014/05/13 · arxiv created 2014/12/30 · arxiv updated 2014/12/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

In this paper we compare two solution concepts for general multicriteria zero-sum matrix games: minimax and Pareto-optimal security payoff vectors. We characterize the two criteria based on properties similar to the ones that have been used in the corresponding counterparts in the single criterion case, although they need to be complemented with two new consistency properties. Whereas in standard single criterion games minimax and optimal security payffs coincide, whenever we have multiple criteria these two solution concepts differ. We provide explanations for the common roots of these two concepts and highlight the intrinsic differences between them.

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