2015/02/26 by Richard J. La, La, Richard J.
Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · #Complex Network Analysis Techniques #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Physical sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) #Social and Information Networks (cs.SI)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1502.07414
openalex publication_date 2015/02/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We investigate cascades in networks consisting of strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the strategic agents have choices between i) investing in protecting themselves, ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some) risks, and iii) taking no actions. Using a population game model, we study how various system parameters, such as node degrees, infection propagation rate, and the probability with which infected nodes transmit infection to neighbors, affect nodes' choices at Nash equilibria and the resultant price of anarchy/stability. In addition, we examine how the probability that a single infected node can spread the infection to a significant portion of the entire network, called cascade probability, behaves with respect to system parameters. In particular, we demonstrate that, at least for some parameter regimes, the cascade probability increases with the average degree of nodes.