2016/04/28 by Debasis Mishra, Tridib Sharma, Mishra, Debasis +1
Business, Management and Accounting · Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1604.08379
arxiv created 2016/04/28 · openalex publication_date 2016/04/28 · arxiv updated 2016/10/04 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent with more than 99% probability provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also ex-post individually rational. We show that our mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. Since achieving efficiency through a dominant strategy incentive compatible and budget-balanced mechanism is impossible in this model, our results illustrate the limits of this impossibility.