Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games

2016/05/24 by Dharini Hingu, Hingu, Dharini, K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao +3 · 1 citation
Mathematics · #FOS: Mathematics #Optimization and Control (math.OC) #math.OC

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1605.07544

19 Pages

arxiv created 2016/05/24 · arxiv updated 2016/05/25

Abstract

In games with continuous strategy spaces, if a rest point of the replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable then the rest point must be finitely supported (van Veelen, M., Spreij, P., 2009. Evolution in games with a continuous action space. Econom. Theory 39 (3), 355-376). In this article, we address the converse question that is, we prove that a finitely supported population state is asymptotically stable with respect to the variational norm when it is strongly uninvadable.

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