Optimal mechanisms with budget for user generated contents

2019/07/10 by Mengjing Chen, Pingzhong Tang, Chen, Mengjing +7
Computer Science · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) #cs.GT #cs.MA

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.04740

arxiv created 2019/07/10 · arxiv updated 2019/07/11

Abstract

In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the proportional division mechanism, which is widely used in practice, can perform arbitrarily bad in the worst case. The problem can be formulated using a linear program with bounded and increasing variables. We then present an O(nlog n) algorithm to find the optimal mechanism, where n is the number of players.

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