2021/04/19 by Siwei Chen, Chen, Siwei, Yajing Chen +4
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Economic theories and models #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) #econ.TH
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2104.09157
openalex publication_date 2021/04/19 · arxiv created 2021/06/30 · arxiv updated 2021/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
School choice is of great importance both in theory and practice. This paper studies the (student-optimal) top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in an axiomatic way. We introduce two new axioms: MBG (mutual best group)-quota-rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. While stability implies MBG-quota-rationality, MBG-robust efficiency is weaker than robust efficiency, which is stronger than the combination of efficiency and group strategy-proofness. The TTCM is characterized by MBG-quota-rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. Our results construct a new basis to compare the TTCM with the other school choice mechanisms, especially the student-optimal stable mechanism under Ergin but not Kesten-acyclic priority structures.