2023/05/19 by Jonas Tallberg, Magnus Lundgren, Tallberg, Jonas +3 · 1 citation
Computer Science · Social Sciences · #Corruption and Economic Development #Ethics and Social Impacts of AI #FOS: Economics and business #General Economics (econ.GN) #Law, AI, and Intellectual Property
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2305.11523
openalex publication_date 2023/05/19 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
As the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) continues to grow, policymakers are increasingly grappling with the question of how to regulate this technology. The most far-reaching international initiative is the European Union (EU) AI Act, which aims to establish the first comprehensive, binding framework for regulating AI. In this article, we offer the first systematic analysis of non-state actor preferences toward international regulation of AI, focusing on the case of the EU AI Act. Theoretically, we develop an argument about the regulatory preferences of business actors and other non-state actors under varying conditions of AI sector competitiveness. Empirically, we test these expectations using data from public consultations on European AI regulation. Our findings are threefold. First, all types of non-state actors express concerns about AI and support regulation in some form. Second, there are nonetheless significant differences across actor types, with business actors being less concerned about the downsides of AI and more in favor of lax regulation than other non-state actors. Third, these differences are more pronounced in countries with stronger commercial AI sectors. Our findings shed new light on non-state actor preferences toward AI regulation and point to challenges for policymakers balancing competing interests in society.