2017/05/10 by Zhigang Chu, Jiazi Zhang, Chu, Zhigang +5
Engineering · #FOS: Electrical engineering #Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis #Power Systems Fault Detection #Smart Grid Security and Resilience #Systems and Control (eess.SY) #electronic engineering #information engineering
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1705.04218
openalex publication_date 2017/05/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to determine the worst-case consequences of FDI attacks aiming to maximize the physical power flow on a target line. This ADBLP can be transformed into a single-level mixed-integer linear program, but it is hard to solve on large power systems due to numerical difficulties. In this paper, four computationally efficient algorithms are presented to solve the attack optimization problem on large power systems. These algorithms are applied on the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system with 2383 buses to conduct vulnerability assessments, and they provide feasible attacks that cause line overflows, as well as upper bounds on the maximal power flow resulting from any attack.