Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics

2025/05/22 by Iqbal, Azhar, Honhaga, Ishan, Teffera, Eyoel +4 · 1 citation
#Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2506.07316

Abstract

This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one using advanced drones for attack, and the other defending using tanks. The paper conceptualizes this as a sequential game, illustrating the complex strategic dynamics similar to Stackelberg competition, where moves and countermoves are carefully analyzed and predicted.

Citations

• Optimal Timing of Moving Target Defense: A Stackelberg Game Model

Cited by

• Analytical Stackelberg Resource Allocation in Sequential Attacker--Defender Games

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