Breaking simple quantum position verification protocols with little entanglement

2020/07/30 by Andrea Olivo, Olivo, Andrea, Ulysse Chabaud +5
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #FOS: Physical sciences #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum Physics (quant-ph)

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2007.15808

openalex publication_date 2020/07/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation (INQC) evades apparent quantum and relativistic constraints and allows to attack generic quantum position verification (QPV) protocols (aiming at securely certifying the location of a distant prover) at an exponential entanglement cost. We consider adversaries sharing maximally entangled pairs of qudits and find low-dimensional INQC attacks against the simple practical family of QPV protocols based on single photons polarized at an angle θ. We find exact attacks against some rational angles, including some sitting outside of the Clifford hierarchy (e.g. π/6), and show no θ allows to tolerate errors higher than ≃ 5⋅ 10^-3 against adversaries holding two ebits per protocol's qubit.

Related

• Enhanced No-Go Theorem for Quantum Position Verification
• On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification
• Quantum position verification in one shot: parallel repetition of the f-BB84 and f-routing protocols
• Single-qubit loss-tolerant quantum position verification protocol secure against entangled attackers
• Perfect cheating is impossible for single-qubit position verification