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Core stability in hedonic coalition formation

2012/12/10 by Gerhard J. Woeginger, Woeginger, Gerhard J. · 2 citations
Computer Science · Mathematics · #68R01 #Combinatorics (math.CO) #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS) #Discrete Mathematics (cs.DM) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics #cs.DM #cs.DS #cs.GT #math.CO #msc:68R01

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1212.2236

18 pages

arxiv created 2012/12/10 · arxiv updated 2012/12/12

Abstract

In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade unions. The underlying game theoretic framework is known as coalition formation. This survey discusses the notion of core stability in hedonic coalition formation (where each player's happiness only depends on the other members of his coalition but not on how the remaining players outside his coalition are grouped). We present the central concepts and algorithmic approaches in the area, provide many examples, and pose a number of open problems.

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