2021/07/02 by Vitor Bosshard, Bosshard, Vitor, Sven Seuken +1
Business, Management and Accounting · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2107.01048
openalex publication_date 2021/07/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In this research note, we lay some groundwork for analyzing the manipulability of core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions. In particular, we focus on payment rules based on the bidders' Shapley values. We define a sensitivity metric, and provide analytical results for this metric in LLG, for six different payment vectors used as reference points for minimum-revenue core-selecting payment rules. We furthermore show how this sensitivity affects the derivative of the resulting payment rules.