2022/07/10 by Yaonan Jin, Jin, Yaonan, Pinyan Lu +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2207.04455
openalex publication_date 2022/07/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
This paper establishes the Price of Stability (PoS) for First Price Auctions, for all equilibrium concepts that have been studied in the literature: Bayes Nash Equilibrium \subsetneq Bayes Correlated Equilibrium \subsetneq Bayes Coarse Correlated Equilibrium \bullet Bayes Nash Equilibrium: For independent valuations, the tight PoS is 1 - 1/ e2 ≈ 0.8647, matching the counterpart Price of Anarchy (PoA) bound \citeJL22. For correlated valuations, the tight \PoS is 1 - 1 / e ≈ 0.6321, matching the counterpart PoA bound \citeST13,S14. This result indicates that, in the worst cases, efficiency degradation depends not on different selections among Bayes Nash Equilibria. \bullet Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium: For independent or correlated valuations, the tight PoS is always 1 = 100%, i.e., no efficiency degradation, different from the counterpart PoA bound 1 - 1 / e ≈ 0.6321 \citeST13,S14. This result indicates that First Price Auctions can be fully efficient when we allow the more general equilibrium concepts.